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1. Complicated Legacies of Justice: The Netherlands and World War II 
Chrisje Brants 
 
 
A. Introduction 
 
After the Second World War, a process of what we now call transitional justice was initiated 
in the Netherlands to deal with crimes committed during the German occupation. Known as 
‘extraordinary justice’ (bijzondere rechtspleging), it featured a mixture of criminal, 
administrative and disciplinary courts and tribunals with special jurisdiction over 
collaboration, treason and crimes such as murder, torture and pillage. While the deportation 
and murder of some 75% of the country’s Jewish population in the death camps of Eastern 
Europe did figure in the extraordinary courts as the background to some of the crimes, it was 
not the main concern.  
Extraordinary justice was always highly politicised, based on the assumption that the 
good could be clearly separated from the bad, and aimed at ridding the country of all who had 
made the ‘wrong choice’, i.e. sympathised or colluded with National Socialism and/or the 
German occupier. Focussed on what was defined as individual political criminality, it left 
little scope for dealing with the bystander role of the majority of the Dutch population or with 
such institutions as the police and civic authorities in colluding in crimes of the occupation. 
Moreover, the necessity of stabilising the political situation and rebuilding a devastated 
country meant that within ten years of the process being wound up, most Dutch perpetrators 
had been released and business was back to normal.  
At least, so it seemed, but the social division between the right and the wrong, the 
good and the bad, and between the main group of victims of the war, the Jews, and the rest of 
society was to last for decades. For those arrested and detained and/or sentenced by the 
extraordinary courts and tribunals, and for many others whose attitude had simply been 
politically incorrect, ‘normal’ meant silence. Fear of others finding out and the ostracism that 
would inevitably follow, precluded their participation in discussions about the war or even 
talking about it at home; in any event, debate was impossible in terms other than those 
already firmly established in public discourse. For decades too, the murder of the Dutch Jews 
and the trauma of the survivors were shrouded in silence. What had happened, in particular in 
Amsterdam (where only 10% of the Jewish population survived), and what happened 
afterwards to the survivors were not issues that either the Jews or the Dutch population in 
general cared to discuss in public – and again, often not in private either.1 
 As this wall of silence was very gradually broken down from the middle of the 
1960’s, the fate of Dutch Jewry became what De Haan terms a ‘national trauma’. In his 1997 
book on memory and the persecution of the Jews, he recounts what happened if people asked 
what he was writing about: ‘Simply answering: “the persecution of the Jews”, had the same 
effect as announcing an incurable disease at a birthday party.’2 This trauma does not refer 
specifically to that suffered by Jewish survivors, or even to the Holocaust as such. Rather, it 
concerns the difficulties of dealing with the impact of the emerging facts of the Holocaust 
and how it unfolded in the Netherlands.  
Van Sas describes the sustaining collective memory of the war as a ‘myth of 
resistance’ in which a person could be only hero or blackguard, inherent in which is the 
image of right and wrong: right = resistance, wrong = collaboration; there are no in-
betweens.
3
 According to Blom, this memory both informed and was reinforced by Dutch 
historiography, of which the leading perspective was that of oppression, resistance and 
collaboration, good and bad.
 
He attributes this right-wrong dichotomy to a deep-rooted 
consensus that can be traced back to the period immediately after the war and the process of 
extraordinary justice.
4
  
In the current transitional justice debate, law, especially criminal law, is seen as well-
nigh indispensable in attaining healing for societies torn by traumatic events and for the 
victims of those events. We only have to look at the discourse surrounding the Internaional 
Criminal Court (ICC), political, legal and academic, to discover that international criminal 
law is assumed to help end impunity, promote retribution, reconciliation and conflict 
                                                 
1
 On the lack of public debate: J. Withuis, Jolande, Erkenning. Van oorlogstrauma naar klaagcultuur (De 
Bezige Bij, 2002); A. de Swaan, De maatschappelijke verwerking van oorlogsverledens, in: J. Dane (ed.) 
Keerzijde van de bevrijding. Opstellen over de maatschappelijke, psycho-sociale en medische aspecten van de 
problematiek van oorlogsgetroffenen (Van Loghum Slaterus, 1984), at 54-66; J.H. Schreuder, Wat niet weet, 
wat wél deert (Radboud University Nijmegen, 1999), on the traumatic effects of silence on the second 
generation. Specifically on Jewish survivors: D. Hondius, Return. Holocaust Survivors and Dutch Anti-Semitism 
(Praeger, 2003), at 118 ff. 
2
 I. de Haan, Na de ondergang. De herinnering aan de Jodenvervolging in Nederland (Sdu Uitgevers, 1997), at 
xiii. 
3
 N.C.F. van Sas, De metamorfose van Nederland. Van oude orde naar moderniteit 1750-1900 (Amsterdam 
University Press, 2004) at 63; see also C. van der Heijden, Grijs verleden. Nederland en de Tweede 
Wereldoorlog (Uitgeverij Contact, 2001).  
4
 Blom, J.C.H. , In de ban van goed en fout. Geschiedschrijving over de bezettingstijd in Nederland (Boom, 
2007) at 9-12.  
solution, and provide recognition of and redress for victims which will then contribute to 
conflict resolution, reconciliation etc. in a presumed spiral of fortunate effects.
5
  
Extraordinary justice in the Netherlands appears to have had much more modest aims, 
although in its own way it was just as ambitious (and contradictory) as international criminal 
law, and was in any event seen as an indispensable means of dealing with the past and 
reinstating social order. However, after the courts had finished, those most affected – the 
good, the bad and the victims – had very different perceptions of the justice that had been 
done, indeed of whether justice had been done at all, but their voices were often drowned out 
in the prevailing good-bad discourse. This contribution asks how, in the social-political 
context of the time, extraordinary justice coloured perceptions of events, allowing some to 
flourish and creating a great silence and social division around others. How did those 
perceptions change, and with them, the nature of public debate? With the benefit of hindsight, 
the legacy of extraordinary justice may help us understand more about the significance – and 
limits – of criminal law in processes of transition.6  
  
 
B. Extraordinary Justice 
 
It is impossible to describe in detail here the inception of extraordinary justice, the ins and 
outs of its procedures and its gradual development into something different from what had 
been envisaged. Nevertheless, in order to understand both why the latter happened and what 
the consequences were, we need some idea of the legal framework, the assumptions upon 
which it rested and how it developed in practice.  
 
1. Assumptions and legal framework 
As the war progressed, the Dutch government in exile in London began thinking about what 
should be done with collaborators.
7
 They (the Government) felt swift, severe and just action 
was needed to prevent mob-justice, but, dependent on reports from the Dutch resistance, had 
                                                 
5
 See J. E. Alvarez, Trying Hussein: Between Hubris and Hegemony, Journal of International Criminal Justice 
(2004) 319–29, who calls these goals ‘as ambitious as they are contradictory’. 
6
 See the introduction by N. Wouters to: N. Wouters (ed.), Transitional Justice and Memory in Europe (1945-
2013), (Intersentia, 2014), on the importance of history for understanding processes of justice. 
7 
On the preparations for extraordinary justice i.a.: P. Romijn, Snel, Streng en rechtvaardig. Politiek beleid in 
zake de bestraffing en reclassering van ‘foute’ Nederlander 1945-1955 (De Haan, 1989), at 20; A.D. Belinfante, 
In plaats van bijltjesdag. De geschiedenis van de bijzondere rechtspleging na de Tweede Wereldoorlog (Van 
Gorcum, 1978) at 60-73; and the official Dutch war historian L. de Jong, Het koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de 
Tweede Wereldoorlog. IV, Londen, tweede helft (Staatsuitgeverij, 1979), at 1212-1238.  
no clear idea of the numbers involved nor first-hand knowledge of the situation under the 
occupation. The prevailing notion was that a small, perverse minority had betrayed patriotic 
Dutch citizens, albeit in three different ways.  
There were active collaborators: Dutch fascists in important administrative positions, 
volunteers in the German armed forces and economic profiteers. Then there were the 
members of the hated Dutch fascist party Nationaal Socialistische Beweging (National 
Socialist Movement, always known as NSB) or similar organizations, collaborators by 
definition because of their politics. And finally there were treasonous or unreliable civil 
servants and government employees. All these people were manifestly ‘on the wrong side’ 
and there would, so declared Queen Wilhelmina, be no place for them in free Dutch society.
8
 
These seriously oversimplified assumptions about the actual situation implied both that 
‘right’ and ‘wrong’ were easily distinguishable in practice and that everyone who had not 
openly made the wrong choice must therefore have made the right one. They were translated 
into a legal framework corresponding to the three groups presumed to have behaved 
‘wrongly’.9  
The Decree on Extraordinary Criminal Law of 22 December 1943
10
 concerned 
serious, active collaboration, adding to the relevant provisions of the existing Dutch Criminal 
Code the offences of ‘collaboration with the enemy’ and ‘betrayal’ (essentially subjecting 
another person to measures by the enemy) with a maximum of five years imprisonment; if a 
victim had died as a result, the penalty was life imprisonment or death. In 1947, war crimes 
were added to allow the trial of German citizens. Another decree regulated procedural 
matters, including new extraordinary trial courts and an extraordinary supreme court staffed 
by professional judges.
11
  
The Decree on Purging the Administration
12
 created a disciplinary regime for civil 
servants and government employees who had ‘demonstrated a treasonable attitude’, or could 
                                                 
8
 Speech by Queen Wilhelmina, Free Dutch Radio (Radio Oranje), broadcast from London, 10 May 1941. In 
later years, she spoke several times again of ‘swift, severe and just retribution’ and of isolating and removing all 
‘undesirable elements’.   
9  
For details of disciplinary and criminal law: W.M.E.Noach, De bijzondere rechtspleging. Straf- en 
tuchtrechtelijk optreden tegen onvaderlandslievend gedrag uit de bezettingsjaren, (Martinus Nijhoff, 1948); 
Belinfante, supra note 7; L. de Jong, Het koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog: deel 12 
Epiloog, eerste helft, (Martinus Nijhoff 1988); Administrative cleansing is described by Romijn, supra note 7, at 
79-162. For an overview in English: C.H. Brants, Dealing with the Holocaust and Collaboration: the Dutch 
Experience of Criminal Justice and Accountability after World War 2, 33 Crime, Law and Social Change 3 
(2000) 211-236. 
10
 Besluit Buitengewoon Strafrecht 22 December 1943, Staatsblad D61. 
11
 Besluit Buitengewone Rechtspleging 22 December 1943, Staatsblad D 63; Besluit Bijzondere Gerechtshoven, 
22 December 1943, Staatsblad D 62. 
12
 Zuiveringsbesluit 13 January 1944, Staatsblad  E 14. 
‘not be relied upon to faithfully co-operate in rebuilding the country’.13 Sanctions were 
suspension (with salary) or dishonourable discharge (with loss of salary and, in some cases, 
pension rights). This group was dealt with by a ‘Central Organ’, but there were also separate 
commissions that examined the war record of numerous different professions (journalists, 
university teachers, artists etc.).  
Finally, a Decree on Tribunals
14
 dealt with all Dutch citizens ‘who, during the course 
of hostilities or of the occupation of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, have behaved in a way 
that is abhorrent to every good patriot.’ This could be anything, from assisting the enemy to 
displaying a ‘national-socialist attitude’.15 The lay tribunals, under a professional chairman, 
could impose one of three penalties: ten years internment, the withdrawal of civil rights or 
confiscation of property. This disciplinary law was to culminate with extraordinary criminal 
proceedings, making double jeopardy the norm. Indeed, government employees and other 
professionals could be subject to all three forms of justice. 
 These decrees contained vague, multi-interpretable and overlapping provisions and 
contravened the Dutch Constitution and existing criminal law principles: retro-active 
criminalisation, the death penalty (abolished in the 19th century), lay judges (forbidden by 
the Dutch Constitution), the confiscation of a person’s entire assets and denial of civil rights 
(the outlawed Napoleonic practice of ‘civil death’);16 no appeal on the facts, while appeal to 
the extraordinary supreme court on points of law depended on permission by the trial court.
17
 
The tribunals judged cases brought by members of the public without a public prosecutor on 
whom the onus of proof rested. 
  
2. Unforeseen Practicalities and the Solutions 
Almost immediately after liberation it was obvious that far too many people were caught up 
in a system not yet ready to operate (too few high-ranking and respected judges were 
available
18
 and some prospective chairmen objected to the law they would apply, especially 
mandatory sentencing). Between 120,000 and 150,000 people, some probably innocent, many 
                                                 
13
 Idem Article 3, para.1 
14
 Tribunaalbesluit, 17 September 1944, Staatsblad E101.  
15
 Noach supra, note 9, at 57. 
16
 While by today’s standards the culmination of trial by tribunal and criminal court and of the sanctions that 
both could impose, would be inadmissible, at the time Dutch legal scholars were divided on the matter of double 
jeopardy. 
17
 Under normal Dutch criminal procedure, there is a right to full re-trial by a higher court and to appeal to the 
Supreme Court on points of law.  
18
 With some exceptions, the higher Dutch judiciary had not acquitted itself with particular distinction during the 
occupation; see D. Venema, Rechters in oorlogstijd (Boom Juridische uitgevers 2007). 
suspected of very minor offences, had been arrested and detained.
19
 There was no habeas 
corpus and a serious backlog of judicial cases. Severe overcrowding, food shortages, ill 
treatment and even torture plagued some detention camps. Within months, the Government 
was forced to reduce the numbers by releasing minor cases,
20
 then, when more releases had to 
be contemplated, by changing the definition of a ‘minor case’. Once the legal process was 
underway, procedural rules were held to be unjust and unworkable and this too led to delays 
and then substantial amendments that changed the nature of the envisaged ‘swift, just and 
severe retribution’. 
The Government, however, was not only moved by practical considerations. Social 
and political protest by authoritative figures about conditions in the camps and the harshness 
of the legal rules were gradually picked up by the media. The churches, particularly the 
Catholic Church, appealed urgently to Christian compassion, irreconcilable with ‘eliminating 
people from society’.21 After the release of 40,000 ‘minor cases’, the churches again called 
for compassion. Although the intended release of another 60,000 (the definition of ‘minor’ 
having been extended) led to widespread public protest,
22
 by May 1947 more than 100,000 
people had been set free. Combined with the introduction of habeas corpus for political 
detainees, this left about 3,000 by 1 October 1948.  
The release of ‘political delinquents’ (even if their guilt was not always officially 
determined),
23
 was often conditional on supervision by a new organisation, the STPD 
(Stichting Toezicht Politieke Delinquenten – Foundation for the Supervision of Political 
Delinquents). A private initiative with government subsidy and staffed mainly by volunteers, 
it supervised but also supported convicted and non-convicted ‘political delinquents’ with the 
aim of helping them return to society. It too was vocal in its support of release policies and 
amendments to the court and tribunal process.
24
  
Tribunals were soon allowed to deviate from mandatory sentencing that was 
withdrawn altogether in 1946. In 1947, more flexible penalties were introduced and double 
                                                 
19
 In general it is impossible to give exact figures for the process of extraordinary justice. The first weeks were 
chaotic and not properly documented. The files were not generally available for research until relatively 
recently. Publications show that some files are missing, double, or contain more than one case. See e.g. S. Faber 
and G. Donker, Bijzonder Gewoon. Het Centraal Archief Bijzondere rechtspleging (1944-2000) en de lichte 
gevallen (3rd edn., Stichting moderne Rechtsgeschiedenis, 2010). 
20
 Besluit Politieke Delinquenten 26 October 1945, Staatsblad F244. 
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 De Haan, supra note 2, at 90 ff. 
22
 Noach, supra note 9, at 16-17. 
23
 Belinfante (supra note 7, at 76) thinks it a measure of how well the release policy worked that, of those who 
later appeared before an extraordinary court, only 1.25% was found to have been wrongfully arrested. The other 
side of the coin is that many detainees were, therefore, probably innocent. 
24
 See on the Foundation’s work: J. le Poole, Verslag der werkzaamheden van de Stichting Toezicht Politieke 
Delinquenten over de jaren 1945 t/m 1947 (s.e., 1948). 
jeopardy abolished, thereby legalising what had already become practice: less serious cases 
tried by tribunals only, serious criminal offences by extraordinary courts where there was 
now an automatic right of appeal on points of law i.a. if the death penalty had been imposed.  
The purging process also underwent substantive changes, most importantly perhaps 
because the country would come to a standstill if too many were removed from their jobs. At 
an early stage, more flexible sanctions and differentiation between categories of seriousness 
were introduced: ‘mistakes’ during the war could result in a caution (public or non-public) or 
demotion; less serious cases were punishable by honourable discharge with no loss of 
pension rights, and minor cases by demotion; the original decree remained applicable to 
serious cases only. 
In total, after release of the minor cases, the courts and tribunals dealt with 
approximately 65,000 people, 8% of whom were acquitted, with 16% receiving fines, 60% 
sentences of more than five years, 9% between five and ten years, and 3% between ten and 
15 years; 578 people were sentenced to more than fifteen years, 148 to life and 152 to death 
of whom 40 were executed.
25
 By 1964, all of the convicted Dutch citizens were free. Most 
government employees who had been dismissed were rehabilitated by the beginning of the 
1950’s, successfully campaigning in 1956 for restoration of their pension rights.  
 
3. From Collective to Individual Retribution 
The decrees on extraordinary justice and purging the administration were intended as a 
system of collective retribution, but the simplistic notion on which they were based – that 
within the three different ‘wrong’ groups, all were equally culpable – bore little resemblance 
to the variations in war-time behaviour. As the legal process went on, it became clear that 
more scope for individual differentiation was needed. Procedural amendments helped, but the 
finer shades of distinction are to be found in the sentencing practices through which 
collective justice evolved into individual justice. At the same time, the idea that everyone 
should (let alone could) be tried faded into the background, although the underlying reasons 
differ between the purge and the process of administrative and criminal justice.  
Not all supported the collective purge of the Dutch administration: some thought a 
public servant should remain at his post in ‘the interests of the country’,26 others objected to 
                                                 
25
 These figures are provided by P. Romijn and Eric Schumacher, Transitional Justice in the Netherlands after 
World War II, in: N. Wouters (ed.), Transitional Justice and Memory in Europe (1945-2013) (Intersentia 2014), 
at 133-171. 
26
 De Haan, supra note 2, at 89-94. 
what they saw as discrimination of the ‘little man’ while the big shots got off.27 There were 
indeed large discrepancies in the punishment meted out to civil servants and government 
employees caught up in the purge (about 10% of the total), among them very high-ranking 
officials such as mayors and chiefs of police; some were dishonourably discharged and 
prosecuted, others not.
28
 Moreover, the idea of a collective purge of the ideologically 
unsound contradicted the reality of an administration under occupation.  
All who remained in government employment by definition co-operated with enemy, 
but seldom as intentional collaborators or traitors: there were active collaborators; there were 
also heroes who sabotaged the enemy’s work; the great majority simply got on with the job. 
Dealing with the highest officials who had remained in office until the very end soon 
overshadowed the purge of minor employees that gradually ground to a halt. Romijn 
attributes this to the power struggle between the new and old elite, it being imperative for the 
latter that purging the administration did not become a divisive political issue.
29
 But there 
were also considerations of just retribution, of not blaming the lower ranks for following the 
example of their superiors and of making sure that individual circumstances were taken into 
account. 
The individualisation of sanctions was even more apparent in extraordinary criminal 
and administrative justice,
30
 where sentences gradually became less harsh, most noticeably at 
the extraordinary courts. The maximum penalty for joining enemy forces, for example, was 
death, and some death sentences were passed and executed. Over time, courts came to 
distinguish between the Waffen SS (regarded as most reprehensible) and other branches of 
the German forces, took into account the youthful age of most volunteers who, after 1947, 
were no longer prosecuted, and brought the sentence for Waffen-SS’ers down to between 
eight and 15 years. While it is less easy to discover clear sentencing patterns for the other 
capital offences, betrayal and collaboration, here too sentences for even very serious crimes 
became more lenient as the courts discovered that, however immoral a person’s behaviour 
and horrific the consequences, there was always some case that was worse. Eventually, the 
notion of collective justice was entirely abandoned as courts sought to ensure that the 
punishment fitted the individual crime.  
Although the consequences of many acts of betrayal were the same (the victims died), 
there were obviously different circumstances, motives and degrees of blame. In 1945, one 
                                                 
27
 Romijn, supra note 7, at 20. 
28
 De Haan, supra note 7, at 88-89; Romijn, supra note 7, at 143 ff. 
29
 Romijn, supra note 7, at 95-109 
30
 The following is based on Belinfante, supra note 7, ch. IX-XII. 
incident and the death of one person could lead to a death sentence. Later, the death penalty 
was rare. In 1949, for example, a Dutch ‘businessman’ who conned several Jews into paying 
to be ‘smuggled to England’ then handed them over to the Germans, was sentenced to 15 
years in prison.
31
 Public officials who had merely done their job did not appear before the 
extraordinary courts. Only those who had been more than enthusiastic in assisting the 
occupying forces were prosecuted, with police officers who had hunted down Jews in hiding 
or betrayed resistance workers receiving harsh sentences until the very end.  
It was also clear that severe penalties for low-ranking employees or policemen were 
problematic considering the bad example often given by superiors.
32
 However, even when the 
perpetrators were mayors, individualisation and mitigation in sentencing became the norm 
over the years, although the courts continued to regard NSB-membership as an aggravating 
factor. In 1945, for example, the NSB-mayor of Wassenaar was sentenced to life (later 
commuted to 20 years, although his actions had not had any dire results. Three years later, the 
mayor of Amsterdam, not a member of the NSB, received three years; his NSB-colleague in 
The Hague, 12; the mayor of Rotterdam, a considerably more active collaborator than either 
of the others, got ten years. The great majority of Dutch Jews had been deported under their 
leadership. Most difficult were the cases of the ‘good’ mayors, who had been appointed 
before the war and had never sympathized with national-socialism. They too had sometimes 
delivered Jews into the hands of the Germans. After consideration of the circumstances, they 
got off sometimes very lightly.  
 
4. A Policy of Pardons 
In 1950, the process of extraordinary justice gradually came to an end. A 1949 parliamentary 
inquiry commission examined the role of government under the occupation but decided the 
part played by high-ranking civil servants who had ‘looked after the country’s affairs’ after 
the government fled to London, did not really come under its mandate; it did no more than 
state that ‘some civil servants were insufficiently aware of where to draw the line’.33 Then, 
while the extraordinary courts were still sitting, the Government embarked on a policy of 
pardons. Partly a response to public opinion where vengeful feelings had somewhat subsided 
(though not towards the Germans), and to pleas for clemency by the churches and 
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 Belinfante, supra note 7, at 372. 
32
 ‘[I]n many branches of the police force, we find the most serious offences … committed by the highest 
ranking officers…and what is worse, by shifting the burden of their responsibility as superiors onto their 
subordinates to whom fell the actual dirty work…We also find poignant discrepancies in the sentencing of such 
cases (Extraordinary Supreme Court, 8 November 1948). 
33
 De Haan, supra note 2, at 91. 
authoritative legal scholars, above all the policy of pardons was driven by socio-political and 
economic considerations. The country was devastated, the population split by memories of 
the war; rebuilding a stable society and viable economy was impossible without 
reconciliation and thus reintegration of political delinquents. Enough was enough.  
In 1947, discrepancies in sentencing that came to light on appeal to the Extraordinary 
Supreme Court were resolved by commuting harsh sentences imposed immediately after the 
war. 1948, Queen Wilhelmina’s jubilee year, saw the first of several mass pardons. The first 
youthful volunteers were pardoned in 1949, soon followed by the older ones. In 1950, 
pardons were issued for all those with ten years still to serve, later followed by a commission 
to look into cases with 15 years remaining. Then in 1951, lifers began to be pardoned. In the 
following years, increasing numbers of prisoners were pardoned and freed, among them 67 
who had originally received death sentences.
34
  
 
 
C. Perceptions of Justice and Legacies of Silence 
 
Already while extraordinary justice was ongoing, and certainly afterwards, there was a 
festering pool of dissatisfaction that was to flare up in public debate in the years to come.
35
 
But the specific groups concerned – ex-resistance fighters, Jewish survivors and collaborators 
– were different, and so too the reasons for their disillusionment. It was partly the legal 
process itself that led to perceptions that justice had not been done, but this cannot be 
separated from its socio-political context. These different perceptions, deriving from very 
different experiences of the war, were not equally represented in public discourse; some were 
silenced for many years, only to emerge as the respective groups found a voice and the nature 
of public debate gradually changed.   
 
1. The Resistance 
Those directly and professionally involved or interested (government ministers, judges, legal 
scholars and practitioners, academics), in short the old elite, felt that extraordinary justice had 
been a success once the practical problems were solved. But a substantial part of public 
opinion as represented in the now legal war-time underground press, the new political parties 
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 Because there had been public unease about executing the death penalty given that it could not be appealed, 
by March 1946 death sentences were not carried out anyway unless the Crown had considered a pardon. Those 
remaining were eventually all commuted to life. 
35
 Romijn and Schumacher, supra note 25, at 151. 
striving for power and especially ex-members of the resistance saw the policy of releasing so 
many from detention, the extension of the definition of ‘minor cases’ in 1945-1946, the 
increasingly lenient sentences and the pardons as unwarranted leniency. ‘…The law must 
have its course…Those who dispense justice should know that they are subjecting our people 
to a new crime if they hesitate to punish the guilty…we do not ask for the hangman, but for 
justice according to honour and conscience.’36  
It is unknown who wrote this, but it neatly sums up feelings of many resistance 
members, part of the new elite, who were highly critical of the policies of the old governing 
parties, including the way extraordinary justice was handled and the (political) compassion 
that guided its course. Twenty five years later, after the publication of what is still the classic 
study on extraordinary justice,
37
 ex-resistance fighter (and criminologist) Willem Nagel was 
unable to hide the anger he had felt at the time. Writing under his pen name, J.B. Charles, he 
exclaimed: ‘Has it taken until 1978 for us to be shocked by the compassion that poisoned the 
so-called justice of 1945?’38 This concept of ‘compassion’ has been explained as the 
expression of a predominantly catholic moral, exceedingly useful for the powerful catholic 
party that formed part of the first post-war coalition governments and also provided the 
prime-minister. A number of authors see extraordinary justice in this framework.
39
  
Compassion was a way of depoliticizing the issue – an appeal to fundamental 
Christian values not easily opposed politically – and, with it, the Resistance whose members 
became the war heroes of yesterday, not the political heroes of today. Resistance in the 
Netherlands did not really come into its own until halfway through the war. However, those 
who resisted the Germans from the outset were almost all politically motivated and organized 
accordingly. The largest group arose from the communist party, while others organized 
around socialist and/or pacifist leaders. The other significant group came from the Dutch 
reformed church. Their common ground was a desire for a new order after liberation, though 
they differed on what should constitute that order. This was a politically destabilizing factor 
in post-war society and the governing elite were keen to prevent the Resistance as such 
becoming a political group. Being silenced as a political force, however, is not the same as 
silence about the role of the Resistance.  
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Immediately after the war, there was much public interest in the resistance and several 
ex-members published widely-read memoirs.
40
 These set the tone for a discourse of patriotic 
heroism,
41
 reinforced in 1947 by the award of pensions for members of the former Resistance 
and their families. Hondius refers to a ‘new social hierarchy’ formed in the reaction after the 
war: resistance fighters at the top, collaborators at the bottom … a hierarchy [that] was 
widely accepted and has remained in place and essentially unchanged since 1945’.42 But 
while this informed the myth of resistance, one group was excluded: the communist ex-
resistance, whom the cold war pushed down the social hierarchy and deprived of the 
authority their war record conferred. Paradoxically, while the Resistance was depoliticised, 
discussions about the war were conducted in the distinctly politicised, ideological frame of 
democracy versus totalitarianism. What was not needed in that context, were personal stories 
of injustice, precisely what Jewish survivors needed to tell.
43
 
 
2. Jewish Survivors 
The voice of Jewish survivors recently returned from the camps or re-emerging from hiding 
was barely heard after the war. In so far as they were directly concerned with extraordinary 
justice, they, or their now dead family members, were simply individual victims. The process 
had not done justice to the experience of genocide, but this was something they could not 
articulate. In the prevailing discourse, Jews were no different from anyone else who survived 
the war, a reflection of a strict government policy of neutrality: no single category of war 
victims was to be favoured above others. ‘Collective victimisation’,44 however, hid the fact 
that a tragedy had befallen the Jews that was of a different order to what had happened to the 
Dutch as a nation, even during the horrendous final year of starvation, lack of fuel and an 
increasingly brutal occupation, during which thousands died. This ‘hunger winter’ also fed 
the population’s perception of collective victimisation: granted, the Jews were in camps but 
we ate tulip bulbs or starved. 
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Jewish survivors felt betrayed – yet again – on returning to the Netherlands,45 where 
they met indifference and sometimes hostility at the borders and in the cities where their own 
community no longer existed, and struggled to recover confiscated or (mis)appropriated 
property. In some cases, non-Jewish neighbours refused to return goods entrusted to them for 
safe-keeping, even expressing open displeasure that the rightful owner had returned alive.
46
 
More than anything, there was lack of understanding: the Jews should stop whining, be 
grateful for what they had and get on with their life. In the midst of what was at best 
indifference to the particular nature of their experience, traumatised Jewish survivors were 
unwilling and afraid to manifest themselves as such.  
This silence was finally broken after 20 years. More important in the Dutch context 
than the trial of Adolf Eichmann (although that led to shock and disbelief), was the television 
series De Bezetting (The Occupation), a prequel to official historian L. de Jong’s magnus 
opum on the Netherlands during World War II. On May 3 1962, the episode on the 
persecution, deportation and murder of the Dutch Jews stunned the audience and the media. 
De Jong encouraged another Jewish historian, J. Presser, to write a specific history of the 
Jews during the occupation.
47
 Ondergang (Downfall) appeared in 1965, a harrowing tale of 
exclusion and destruction. Then, at the beginning of the 1970’s, reports began to appear on 
‘concentration camp syndrome’ and in 1972, a television documentary about a psychiatrist 
and his Jewish patients (Begrijp je nu waarom ik huil? – Now do you understand why I 
weep?), drove home the reality of living with memories of the Holocaust.  
Jewish survivors now had a voice, raised that same year in public protest against 
granting pardons to the last remaining – German – prisoners serving life sentences (the so-
called Three of Breda). Many academics and clergy supported release – and for the same 
reason: life imprisonment is inhumane. But anti-release groups were vociferous and shared a 
different sentiment: to release these Germans is to inflict yet more suffering on their victims. 
Such was the public outcry that, after an emotional parliamentary debate, the pardons were 
refused. A year later, when Jewish victim-survivors were specifically compensated (Wet 
Uitkering Vervolgingsslachtoffers – Law on Support of Victims of Persecution), this was 
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justified as an act of special solidarity on the part of the Dutch population.
48
 The Germans 
(now two, one died in prison) were not released until 1989; both died shortly afterwards in 
Germany. 
 
3. Collaborators 
Despite the releases and pardons, the efforts of the STPD that latterly had functioned as a 
reintegration service for political delinquents, and the political stress on rebuilding the 
country, the reconciliatory ideas of political and social elites were not shared by the 
population in general.
49
 This was partly due to dissatisfaction with extraordinary justice, but 
there was also anger at the support and housing collaborators received while victims 
struggled to make ends meet amid a general housing shortage. The STPD noted that many ex-
political delinquents found it impossible to find jobs, were shunned by neighbours and that 
their children were discriminated against by friends and even teachers.
50
 In later years, the 
group was no longer categorically rejected, but their position was difficult enough for them to 
shroud their past in protective silence. At the same time, many were also angry about the 
treatment meted out in the first months after liberation and their children grew up in an 
atmosphere of silent bitterness. 
  Early attempts to break the silence were met with hostility and disbelief. In 1949, a 
Dutch fascist published a report on the detention camps, detailing the ill-treatment, starvation 
rations, torture and even murder of detainees.
51
 Although some were shocked, the more so 
since the facts were corroborated by less suspect sources,
52
 the Government took steps to 
improve the situation and the fuss died away. Only recently has there been serious and 
detailed research into what happened in this ‘forgotten past’ (the subtitle of one such 
publication).
53
 As to the fact of collaboration, in 1967 the first attempt to throw some light on 
who the collaborators were and what their motives,
54
 met with a storm of criticism especially 
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from papers that were a continuation of the underground press. Even in the 1980’s studies of 
collaborators received little general attention.
55
 
 Collaborators had always been reluctant to seek a public platform. In 1947, a number 
of leading ex-NSB members had apologized publicly, but this admission of guilt was not 
taken seriously and there were no more large scale attempts.
56
 According to Tames, while 
reintegration was certainly not easy and there was no real reconciliation, things were not as 
bad in practice as the right-wrong discourse would suggest; collaborators were ‘allowed’ 
back, but only in so far as they were prepared to admit their fundamental guilt, making them 
ever dependent on the conditional good will of others.
57
 Their children formed a particularly 
difficult and vulnerable group, who, for obvious reasons, were both traumatized by the 
silence and/or the knowledge of who their parents were, and yet could not speak out of 
loyalty or fear, or both. During the 1980’s, they were grudgingly but not widely recognised as 
one of the groups for whom the war had brought specific traumas.
58
 It is, however, only in the 
past ten years that their individual stories have started to be told.
59
 
  
 
D. The bystander role of the Dutch population 
 
If the three specifically dissatisfied groups were eventually able to articulate their feelings, 
until the end of the millennium neither they nor anyone else managed to put the one subject 
enduringly smothered by the myth of resistance on the agenda of public debate: the bystander 
role of the great majority of Dutch citizens. Writing on protests against ‘lenient’ justice, the 
director of the STDP noted: ‘So many compatriots bear some moral guilt, because … they 
refused to help those in need. The more they proclaim they were “anti”, though in reality 
“neutral”, during the occupation, the louder they are after liberation!’60 Years later and after 
the Three of Breda affair, a legal scholar noted: ‘…the settling of accounts for what happened 
to the Jews … should include the culpable negligence of the Dutch. If solidarity with victims 
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is enforced through punishing the Three of Breda, extraordinary justice becomes an alibi for 
all those only too keen to pass their own failings and blame to the Germans.’61 Then, as 
before, there was little room for such soul searching. Right versus wrong defined the war 
years from the beginning, continually reinforced in the writings of historians such as de Jong 
and Presser,
62
 and by sporadic revelations that public figures had been ‘wrong’ during the 
war. After one such incident, the then Dutch Prime Minister Lubbers wrote in a private letter: 
‘The image this society…has of the war is totally out of focus. “You were right or you were 
wrong”. The reality of grey is completely ignored.’63 
 That grey reality is now the subject of much new research, following a call by Blom 
to move forward from the right-wrong dichotomy. Why the persecution of the Jews was so 
catastrophic in the Netherlands has become a pressing question for historians: the Dutch 
paradox, for were not the Jews always received with great tolerance?
64
 Yet, of all Western 
European countries, the Netherlands lost the greatest percentage of its Jewish population 
(75%, as opposed to 25% in France, for example, and 40% in Belgium). There have many 
explanations as to why the Dutch Jews fared so badly. Obviously, the Netherlands has no 
wild countryside (as in France) and bordered no neutral country to which to escape (as did 
Denmark). More importantly, deportations in the Netherlands were uninterrupted and less 
violent than elsewhere, while the Jewish Council continued to cooperate till the end. The 
Jews of the Netherlands were highly assimilated and ‘clung to the legal options which then 
proved to be part of the deportation system’.65  
 This is with the benefit of hindsight, and so too are explanations as to why the 
majority and the Dutch administration were so compliant. According to Romijn, protecting 
the population at large, not its most vulnerable group, was the authorities’ priority. In the 
mixture of force and deceit that the Germans employed, tolerating discrimination of the Jews 
seemed wiser than protest. But this was a slippery slope and these ‘politics of lesser evil’ 
became bankrupt by 1943 when the Germans turned their attention to the Dutch population 
itself, and evading forced labour in Germany became the acceptable reaction (although many 
did go).  
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This attitude on the part of the (highest) authorities partly explains why, when public 
servants were required to sign the ‘declaration of Aryan descent’, only seven non-Jews in the 
whole country refused, or why the gradual exclusion of Jews from public life went ahead so 
smoothly.
66
 When the razzias started in February 1941, there was brief and violent public 
protest in Amsterdam led by communist dockers (the ‘February Strike’); it was put down 
harshly, but made the Germans more circumspect in rounding up Jews for deportation. Van 
der Heijden points out that there was comparatively little resistance until 1943 and that armed 
resistance was also less than in other countries. He puts the compliance of the population 
down to an inclination to compromise, obedience to authority and trust in the 
administration.
67
 
 But hindsight now begs the question of what people knew then. Private diaries from 
the period show that many were distressed by what was happening to the Jews (if also mildly 
anti-Semitic) but that they did not understand its significance, despite the stories about 
destruction and extermination in ‘the East’ as broadcast via the BBC and underground 
press.
68
 While Van der Heijden also doubts how much people knew, the main gist of his 
study is that the ‘grey, middle-of-the-road position of the bystander’ made it was easier to 
avoid trouble and adapt to an increasingly difficult reality. Historians are coming to see this 
as a continuation of pre-war social and political relations: the capacity of both administration 
and population to adapt derives from a political culture of accommodation that made contact 
and cooperation with the Germans possible without its necessarily being (perceived as) 
collaboration.
69
 
Part of the Dutch paradox, this also goes some way to explaining the myth of 
resistance and the great silence that shrouded first the fate of the Jews and later, when the 
facts were known, the role the Dutch themselves had played in it. Withuis stresses that, 
because the experience and significance of the war and post-war situation differed for 
different groups, it was impossible to find a collective narrative for the future. The failure to 
protect the Jews is hardly a candidate, especially not in a country that regards itself as 
extremely tolerant. And so the narrative evolved towards oppression and heroic resistance. 
The more this is emphasised, however, the more the decidedly unheroic attitude towards the 
deportations must be denied, notions of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ dominate the debate and, where 
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silence reigns in the absence of a narrative that all can share, post-war traumas are 
medicalised rather than treated as social problems.
70
  
 The new historiography has created a narrative something akin to collective guilt for 
what happened to the Jews, both during and after the war; there is more understanding of the 
role of so-called collaborators
71
 and certainly of the difficulties their children faced (although 
to have been the child of ‘wrong’ parents is a stigma most would prefer to avoid, even today). 
Interestingly, as this new truth, ‘the guilty Dutch’, took hold, studies of the resistance 
celebrating its heroes began to appear as if to ward off the risk that their memory would 
succumb to the weight of collective responsibility.
72
  
 
 
E. Conclusion 
 
With the exception of what happened in the detention camps, the unofficial reaction to 
collaborators was fairly mild in the Netherlands, certainly in comparison with, say, France. In 
that, extraordinary justice was certainly successful. But it was also inevitably flawed, 
procedurally, but perhaps more importantly, as a social process. The courts struggled with the 
realization that the stark categories of right and wrong had only some link with reality and 
that collective justice was therefore no justice at all, and did their best to provide fair trial and 
punishment in the individual circumstances. That this was viewed as too lenient was 
exacerbated by the release and pardon policies. Yet, leniency and ‘compassion’ cannot 
simply be dismissed as part of the political struggle of the time. A measure of due process, 
establishing individual guilt, proportional sentencing, some degree of equality through 
mitigation of the harsh sentences of the early years, releasing minor cases and attempting to 
prevent the perpetual exclusion from society of those found wanting, were not merely 
pragmatic-political issues but justifiable concerns of judges, legal scholars and government 
wrestling with the question: what is just retribution in such extraordinary circumstances?  
Knowing what we know now, it seems extraordinary indeed that the whole process 
was premised on the ideological-political distinction of right and wrong, so that the offences 
specifically designed to accommodate the circumstances of the war reflect the notion that all 
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politically unsound individuals – and they alone – were perpetrators. The process therefore 
aimed at denying the politically unsound a place in society; the sanctions – life sentences, the 
death penalty, the ‘civil death’ of total confiscation of assets and denial of civil rights, 
lustration – were all intended to achieve just that. But in the absence of any connection to 
wartime realities, this concept could not, by definition, make good on its promises; neither 
could it do justice to the realities of the crimes and criminals of the occupation. Thus it was 
preconditioned to leave a legacy of divisiveness.     
Extraordinary justice has been criticised for this failure to promote a society 
conducive to an inclusive debate that could lead to reconciliation.
73
 Given that it was founded 
on notions of exclusion that is hardly surprising. To expect the legal process to lead to 
reconciliation in such post-conflict situations, probably always asks too much of the criminal 
law, for it would be to ignore that every legal process is a function of the social and political 
context in which it operates
74
 and, moreover, to conflate law and its application with justice. 
A court’s verdict is definite and authoritative; closure, not continued debate about what it 
establishes as legal truth, is its purpose.
75
 Justice, like history with which it is closely 
intertwined, is an open-ended quest for historical truth and understanding.
76
 In the context of 
conflict and transition, justice is a permanent struggle in different theatres of memory, 
confronting different truths of very complex, traumatic social and political events. It is a 
collective process and can only be achieved if all can recognise a collective version of the 
past, or at least the validity of different, contested memories. 
If the legal process of extraordinary justice failed, it is because it could not produce 
even the beginnings of a collective version of the past. That it did produce a divisive right-
wrong dichotomy should not surprise: establishing ‘wrong’ as opposed to right is what 
criminal trials are about. But there was another inherent mechanism at work that is specific to 
the underlying ideology of Dutch post-war justice. The truth about the destruction of the 
Jewish people that emerged from the trials was a patchwork of collaboration and betrayal by 
individual perpetrators. To betray a Jew was a politically unpatriotic act that usually led to the 
death of the victim so that the maximum penalty was death (and indeed, death sentences were 
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imposed and carried out), but it was no more nor less than any other act of betrayal that had 
cost lives. Parallel to the prevailing political and social discourse, victimhood was, literally, 
‘neutralised’, so that the Holocaust as a phenomenon and the particular collective victimhood 
of the Jews (as opposed to the collective victimhood of the Dutch population as a whole) 
were not, and could not be, addressed as specific issues.  
Similarly, the identification of perpetrators as unpatriotic and politically unsound 
individuals buried the difficult moral question of the co-operation of almost the whole 
administration and the passive attitude of practically the whole population. That releases, 
pardons and reintegration schemes failed to bring reconciliation any closer despite the 
rhetoric of rebuilding the nation, is also logical. They were top-down policies that left the 
past behind and closed off divisions, while reconciliation is an ongoing social dialogue about 
precisely what it is that divides.  
That the path of justice in the Netherlands proved so rough is not simply a result of 
how its legal component operated. Criminal trials are but are small part of the process of 
justice itself and few now remember the contribution of extraordinary criminal justice at all. 
That criminal courts and tribunals sentenced tens of thousands in a series of trials lasting 
more than 6 years – no mean feat – is specialized, not general knowledge. Its contribution to 
a legacy of dichotomous public discourse, however, has proved lasting. The prevailing image 
of the reckoning, seen on television year after year around liberation day, is of men in old-
fashioned raincoats and hats, hands in the air and a placard reading ‘traitor’ round their necks, 
manhandled through the streets by a couple of armed resistance men and a jeering mob; or of 
girls – moffenmeiden77 – having their head roughly shaved amid the sunny festival-like 
atmosphere of newly liberated towns. It is the enduring imagery of right and wrong. 
Likewise, a lecture-series at the Resistance Museum in Amsterdam marking the 70
th
 
anniversary of the end of the war bears the title ‘Heroes and Villains’. No Dutch person needs 
to be told what that means in the context of the war.   
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